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In 1748, Charles de Montesquieu published a scientific study
of comparative law. A short time later, De l'sprit des lois appeared among the banned books of the papal index. Rarely has a
treatise on law provoked such a sharp response from ecclesiastical authorities. Montesquieu's purpose was to dissect and lay
bare law's origins, presumptions, and soul. His work reflected the
certainty of the Enlightenment that reason should permeate all
human institutions and that by skillfully using reason one could
penetrate the complexity of a system of thought and reveal its
clean, rational, sturdy structure. Montesquieu believed that positive, man-made law should be delicately balanced by transcendental norms, which he called natural law, and that the power
and authority of human legislative and judicial institutions
should also be carefully balanced. Most importantly, he thought
that one could discover the "spirit" of the law by studying the
"esprit g6n6ral" of the people, the climate in which they lived,
and their customs, religion, and political institutions.
Distinguished legal historians no longer provoke the same
kind of censorious reaction, but they are still interested in capturing the essence of the law's soul. The newest successor to
t Professor of Medieval History, Syracuse University.
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Montesquieu's project is a series entitled The Spirit of the Laws,
edited by the distinguished legal historian Alan Watson, who
also wrote Volume One, The Spirit of Roman Law. Richard
Helmholz penned the second volume of the series, The Spirit of
Classical CanonLaw. Further volumes are promised on Chinese,
Biblical, Talmudic, Common, Hindu, Customary, Japanese, and
International law. An editor's note in the front of Helmholz's
book states that the series will be "concerned less with the rules
of the law and more with the relationships of the laws in each
system with religion and moral perspectives; the degree of complexity and abstraction; classifications; attitudes to possible
sources of law; authority; and values enshrined in law" (p iii).
Montesquieu would be, I think, satisfied with that goal.
Montesquieu studied Roman law and wrote a book on the
fall of the Roman Empire, a theme that Edward Gibbon would
immortalize later in the eighteenth century.' Watson carries
Montesquieu's fascination with Roman jurisprudence into the
twentieth century for good reasons. The Romans' contribution to
jurisprudence remains pervasive in the European civil law tradition and significant in the Anglo-American common law. Its influence is not limited to the West. European colonialism transplanted not only the West's economic and political institutions
but also its law into other cultures. Today, there is almost no legal system on the face of the earth that has not accrued debts to
Roman jurisprudence.2
Alan Watson, however, had to decide which Roman law he
would write about. Ancient Roman law began with the Twelve
Tables (circa 450 B.C.E.) and ended shortly after the massive
codification of Justinian, the Corpus iuris civilis (528-534 C.E.).
Within that millennium of jurisprudence, Watson might have
chosen to write about the law of the Roman Republic, the Principate, or the late Imperial period. Or he might have written about
medieval and early modern Roman law. This Roman law was
studied in every law school in Europe from the twelfth century to
the seventeenth, became an integral part of the medieval and
early modern ius commune (about which more below), and directly shaped the structure and content of all modern legal sys1

Charles de Montesquieu, Considerationssur les causes de la grandeurdes Romaine

et de leur decadence (Gamier 1954); Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall
of the Roman Empire (Strahan 1797).
2 For a brief, lucid, and splendid description of the influence of Roman law on modern
legal systems, see John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition:An Introduction to
the Legal Systems of Western Europe and LatinAmerica 6-34 (Stanford 2d ed 1985).
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tems. I would argue that medieval and early modern Roman law
deserves more attention than it has customarily received, because we have borrowed directly from it, not from its ancient
predecessors.
In fact, Watson chose the period from the Twelve Tables to
the end of the "classical period" of Roman law, traditionally dated
to circa 235 C.E. Consequently, he set himself the task of extracting the "spirit" of Roman law from a period in which we do
not have a single complete text of Roman law. The only exception
is the almost complete Institutes of Gaius, who lived in the midde of the second century C.E.3 For Watson, as we shall see,
Gaius's work does not "correspond to the spirit of Roman law,"
even though Justinian's jurists modeled their introductory textbook on Roman law upon the Institutes centuries later (p 201).
Watson finds the true spirit of Roman law in the "values, express and implicit, of those who made the law," that is, the jurists (p xi). He is right to do so. Very few legal systems have been
driven by doctrinal scholars as Roman law was. These jurists
were more important as a source of law than court decisions,
statutes, or the rulings of magistrates. Yet Watson's depiction of
the jurists is open to question. He characterizes them as "first
and foremost politicians or bureaucrats" (p 206), who approached
their legal writings as a recreational activity similar to "pheasant
shooting as it is practiced in the United Kingdom" (p 206). The
hunters have as their goal not only the "killing of pheasants" but
also "winning the respect of one's fellows" (p 206). They are not
interested in the birds themselves, but the exercise is for "the
kindly, gentle but watchful, unorganized training of the next
generation" (p 206). Just as the hunters are not concerned with
the birds, Watson believes that these "powerful figures [the jurists] ... were not really interested in law," but only in winning
"the approbation of their fellows (and others) by proffering an ingenious opinion based on an accepted style of reasoning"
(pp 205-06).
Repeating themes that he has developed in earlier studies,
Watson argues that the spirit of Roman law embodies
"isolationism" in three different senses: the jurists rejected or ignored other legal systems, most obviously Greek law (pp 111-16,
158-67); they concentrated on the law of Rome and paid little attention to the law of the imperial provinces (pp 167-71); and they

' Francis de Zulueta, ed, The Institutes of Gaius: Text with CriticalNotes and Translation (Clarendon 1946).
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were not interested in legal practices or norms of Roman society
(pp 64-73). Many legal historians would agree with parts of these
generalizations, but Watson pushes them further than most
would dare: "Roman jurists argue as if they lived in a vacuum,
remote from economic, social, religious, and political considerations" (p 66). We are told repeatedly that a certain legal development must be ascribed to "the internal logic of the legal tradition, and not at all to economic, social, or political pressures"
(p 137). It has been estimated that the cadre of jurists was small,
perhaps no more than ten or twenty men during the first century
of this era. If Watson is correct, the spirit of Roman law resided
in an extraordinarily minuscule number of souls.
These generalizations about Roman law are particularly
hard-won because all the texts upon which they are based are
small fragments of the writings of the jurists, selected by the
compilers of Justinian's Digest, the most important part of the
Corpus iuris civilis, and almost our only source for their thought.
Watson believes that these fragments contain the spirit that he
seeks, not the entire Digest, which was, "of course, unknown to
the Romans," having been compiled after the fall of the Western
provinces of the empire, in a Greek-speaking city, Constantinople
(p xi). It would be impossible in the space of even a very long review to demonstrate how Watson teases his conclusions out of
this fragmentary material.
A couple of examples will illustrate how Watson reaches his
conclusions and how ambiguous the evidence is. He discusses a
law promulgated by the Roman Senate in 10 C.E. (Senatus consultum Silanianum)that decreed if an owner of slaves (dominus)
was murdered in his home, his slaves should be tortured and
executed. The purpose of the law, says the jurist Ulpian (d. 223
C.E.), was to make "slaves . . . guard their masters."4 Watson
then turns to subsequent juristic interpretation of who could be
called an owner under the law. His source for much of the evidence is a passage in Justinian's Digest by Ulpian, who, following
the lead of a number of his predecessors, restricted the term
dominus considerably. The slaves of masters who held them
through usufruct or in good faith, for example, did not fall under
the law's harsh dictates. If a son or a daughter were killed, the
slaves of their mother were not tortured, even if the children had
been living in the same house with her. Since the law remained
' See p 165, discussing Theodor Mommsen, Paul Krueger, and Alan Watson, eds, 2
The Digest of Justinian29.5.1 at 896-98 (Pennsylvania 1985).
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in force until the time of Justinian, Watson concludes that this is
an example of "Roman legal rules... develop[ing] a life of their
own ..

. [with] little regard ...

to their purpose" (p 165). The

original intent of the statute was to protect slave owners, and the
jurists lost sight of this purpose in a web of elegant argument. He
considers this an aspect of the "isolationism" of the Roman jurists, who never explained in these fragmented texts why they
restricted the term "master."
Yet in this case, one could put a different, and to me a more
convincing, spin on the evidence. Instead of being isolated from
society and immersed in the intricacies of their arguments, the
jurists may have been trying to protect slaves from a draconian
piece of legislation. Over the centuries, most legal systems have
rejected reprisals against undoubtedly innocent people whose
only guilt was geographical proximity to a crime.' Was this an
example of Roman jurists following the inexorable logic of their
arguments, or were the jurists restricting the reach of the statute
for other reasons? I would find other reasons more compelling. It
was, after all, a general tendency in Roman law beginning in the
Principate to ameliorate the treatment of slaves.6
To take another example: The lex Aquilia was promulgated
in the third century B.C.E. and dealt with damage to propertywhat the Romans called delicts, and what we call torts. This
statute has been a favorite teaching tool in European law schools
for illustrating the evolution of Roman legal thought and the role
of the jurists in bringing about change in the legal system. Few
European law students leave school without the "cases" of the
javelin throwers, or the barber in the baths, having become part
of their intellectual baggage on the development of contributory
negligence.' Watson argues that the statute is an example of the
inherent conservatism of Roman law. In spite of the defects of
Aside from notorious modern-day instances of reprisal against innocent populations, there are earlier examples. In 1231, Emperor Frederick H promulgated a law for
the Kingdom of Sicily stipulating that the inhabitants of a place where a secret murder
had been committed should be fined if the perpetrator were not found; later jurists rejected the law's validity. James M. Powell, trans, The Liber Augustalis or Constitutionsof
Melfi Promulgatedby the Emperor Frederick I for the Kingdom of Sicily in 1231 1.28(32)
at 29-30 (Syracuse 1971).
' Watson is well aware of these tendencies. See generally Alan Watson, Roman Slave
Law (Johns Hopkins 1987).
' One might conclude that some American students have also learned these Roman
law lessons and anecdotes from the superb textbook written by Bruce W. Frier, A Casebook on the Roman Law of Delict 91-94 (Scholars 1989). A standard European textbook is
Herbert Hausmaninger, Das Schadenersatzrecht der lex Aquilia (Manzsche Studienbiicher 2d ed 1980).
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the statute and the lacunae in the jurists' commentaries on it,
the lex Aquilia "was never replaced by better legislation or rescript" (p 145). Yet this conclusion could be stood on its head using the same evidence. Rather than a mark of conservatism, the
lex Aquilia could be seen as a tribute to the status, ingenuity,
and importance of the jurists, whose analysis of the statute over
roughly six centuries made replacement unnecessary. One could
conclude that they paid enough attention to the needs of Roman
society and provided sufficient remedies in cases of property
damage that, in spite of the lacunae, two chapters of the original
statute were included in Justinian's Digest eight hundred years
after their promulgation.'
Watson's interpretations are subtle, nuanced, and clever, but
not always completely convincing. However, the point of these
illustrations is not to niggle about Watson's arguments but to illustrate the difficulty of reaching firm conclusions from the evidence.
Gaius (d. after 178 C.E.) challenges every facet of Watson's
conception of Roman law's spirit. Although none of his writings
was cited by jurists before about 250 C.E., jurists of the fourth
century embraced him. In the next century, Theodosius and Valentinianus elevated him to the level of Ulpian and other important jurists in their Law of Citations (426 C.E.). Justinian's jurists used Gaius's Institutes as the model for a new introductory
textbook for Roman law and included fragments from his other
works. The outsider triumphed in the end.
Gaius was everything that Watson's pheasant hunters were
not. Having taught, perhaps, at Berytus (the modern Beirut), he
wrote for students; his book reeks of the classroom. He posed
"Socratic" questions, often giving the contradictory opinions of
his predecessors, and then offering his own resolution. Gaius
tested his conclusions by looking at legal practice in contemporary Roman society. To give one example, he rejected the pretense that women of full age should still be governed by the rules
of Roman tutorship (tutela). Women are not, he argued, deceived
by poor judgment, as earlier jurists presumed to believe. In fact,
according to Gaius, mature Roman women had the right to conduct their own legal affairs. Although the fiction of a tutor remained in second-century Roman society, Gaius pointed out that
the praetor could force a tutor to accede to a woman's wishes,
' One should always remember that the lacunae may be a result of Justinian's jurists' selection of sources, not the jurists' lack of attention to certain points.
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even against his will. Again unlike the jurists, Gaius knew Greek
law and used its terms. He quoted Homer's Iliad to demonstrate
that sale and barter were equivalent legal transactions. He was
the only Roman jurist to write a book on the Provincial Edict, the
vehicle through which Roman law operated outside Rome. The
jurists did not create a system of law (pp 117-23); Gaius attempted to do so, laying out categories and treating subjects like
contracts and delicts as separate fields of law. In Watson's view,
Gaius was unique. No Roman jurist of the classical period followed in his footsteps (p 201).
After reading Watson's book, I was left to wonder how jurists
whose intellectual horizons were so limited, whose curiosity
about other sources of law was so stunted, could have created the
extraordinary legal system that they bestowed on subsequent
generations. It is either a magnificent paradox or a splendid
irony that Roman jurists, who had no passion for the law itself,
who did not view law as a vehicle of social justice, who exiled
themselves to the city, and who strove only to outmatch the elegantly delivered, neatly put arguments of their peers, could have
exercised such great influence on the world's jurisprudence.
Watson has created a riddle to which there can be no definitive answers. Our sources of Roman law are problematic. Although one-third of Justinian's Digest is taken from the writings
of Ulpian, the most important of all Roman jurists, we must understand Ulpian's thought, methodology, and purpose from noncontiguous fragments. Imagine trying to understand and
measure the thought of a modern scholar by reading scattered
paragraphs taken from many different works. Would we think
that Ulpian and the other jurists were more concerned with systematizing Roman law if we had complete texts, as we do for
Gaius?
Watson has provided a challenging picture of Roman jurists,
at odds with how most historians have evaluated them until now,
and quite unattractive in a number of ways-unless, of course,
you prefer the company of English pheasant hunters.9 Aside from
whether a fictive, elite English upper class is the correct analog
for Roman jurists, there remains the question whether any other
' One may conveniently contrast Watson's description of the Roman jurists to that of
Bruce W. Frier, Law, Roman, Sociology of, in Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth,
eds, The Oxford ClassicalDictionary823, 823-25 (Oxford 1996); and Tony Honor4, Lawyers, Roman, in Hornblower and Spawforth, eds, The Oxford Classical Dictionary 835,
835-36. Frier and Honor6, I think, reflect the consensus of historical scholarship in their

articles.
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legal elite in any other society ever had a relationship to law like
the one Watson attributes to the Romans. If they were unique,
and assuming that his picture of them is true, of what interest
could they possibly be for understanding the proper role of a jurist in the legal system and in society? What lessons could these
jurists teach the student of legal history today? I shall return to
that question below.
Watson's Roman jurists are the product of his historical
imagination and, I suspect, what he thinks the role of a jurist in
society should be. Richard Helmholz imagines that medieval jurists had broad horizons, with a learned and engaged relationship to society. Their world was not one in which law floated serenely overhead as a disembodied set of arguments and principles, but one in which they participated as writers, practitioners,
teachers, and officeholders. Their main business was canon lawthe law of the church. They relished the order, rules, principles,
and system of canon law. Today canon law may seem an arcane
branch of irrelevant learning on the tree of jurisprudence. However, thrbughout Europe between 1150 and the time of the Protestant Reformation in 1520, canon law governed the law of marriage, divorce, wills, and all cases in which the clergy were litigants. It was the last universal system of jurisprudence in the
European tradition.
A great virtue of Helmholz's book is its vast scope. He analyzes a wide array of topics in the writings of the major jurists
beginning with Gratian in the mid-twelfth century and ending in
the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century.0 He lays bare 350
years of developing juristic thought and gives the jurists' consensus, their communis opinio, in each area. The result of this approach, never before done on this scale or with this breadth, is to
give us a broad and nuanced appreciation for their ability as jurists. Helmholz's book is a splendid example of what legal history
should be, demonstrating how these jurists reasoned, what options earlier doctrine gave them, and how they shaped Western
jurisprudence. It must be said that no scholar of ancient Roman
law could write a similar book-not because of a lack of talent or
learning, but because Roman law scholars are limited to what
Justinian's jurists decided to put in the Digest. For most subjects,
that reality precludes a detailed analysis of how a particular doctrine evolved from the Republican to the classical period.
0 For a very good history of canon law for this period, see James A. Brundage, Medie-

val Canon Law (Longman 1995).
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Gratian of Bologna established canon law as a coherent field
of study. A figure as shadowy as Gaius, Gratian composed an introduction to the systematic study of canon law between circa
1130 and 1140 and revised it a short time later. He called his
work a Concordia discordantium canonum, a Concord of Discordant Canons." The jurists sensibly shortened his cumbersome title to Decretum. The second recension was immediately adopted
by the teachers in all the law schools of Europe as the standard
introductory text for the study of canon law. Jurists wrote extensive commentaries on it. As we have seen, Gaius's Institutes
lasted four centuries before Justinian gave them a thorough rewriting. Remarkably, Gratian's Decretum lasted almost twice as
long; it was not officially replaced until 1917.
Although both Gaius and Gratian systematized law, their
methodologies were very different. Gaius wrote a coherent description of Roman law, divided into four books. He cited the
opinions of his predecessors, but not their texts. Gratian collected
the texts of the previous millennium, gathering together canons
from ecumenical and provincial councils, papal letters (decretals),
the writings of the Church Fathers, biblical texts, and those of
later writers like Bede, Alcuin, and Peter Damian. He even included passages taken from Roman and Germanic law. Gratian
drew upon a wealth of sources whose breadth and scope may be
unequaled in legal history. Whereas Gaius only occasionally
mentioned the conflicting opinions of earlier jurists, readers of
Gratian were pummeled with the contradictions of the sources.
They were constantly aware that law in the primitive church had
been different and that doctrine had often evolved in several directions over the centuries. Most importantly, the texts permitted them to judge Gratian's conclusions as he picked and chose
from different alternatives in the canonical tradition. 2 In contrast, Gaius's exposition is a seamless garment, summing up
whole areas of jurisprudence and concealing the rough and tumn' Historians have long known from textual anomalies that Gratian must have compiled an earlier version of his work. Anders Winroth recently discovered a copy of the first
recension in a Florentine manuscript and will publish his findings in the 1997 volume of
the Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung ftir Rechtsgeschichte: Kanonistische Abteilung
(forthcoming) (text available at <http'//www.newcastle.ac.uk/nhawl/paper.html>).
Augustine Thompson and James Gordley, trans, Gratian, The Treatise on Laws
(Decretum DD. 1-20) with the Ordinary Gloss (Catholic 1993), have produced a translation of the first twenty distinctions of Gratian and of the Ordinary Gloss to them, with an
introduction by Katherine Christensen. The most extensive treatment of Gratian's
thought remains Stanley Chodorow, ChristianPoliticalTheory and ChurchPolitics in the
Mid-Twelfth Century: The Ecclesiology of Gratian'sDecretum (California 1972).
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ble of his sources from his readers. Unlike Gratian, Gaius did not
incorporate excerpts from earlier jurists in his work. The canonical tradition had to wait another fifty years for a work that was
similar to Gaius's. 3
As my listing of Gratian's sources suggests, the twelfthcentury canonists found law in many cupboards. It must be emphasized that Gratian did not create this catholic panoply of
sources; instead, he inherited it from his predecessors. The canonists also depended on the whole body of Roman law in its medieval guise for principles and doctrine, not just on those texts
that Gratian included. By the end of the twelfth century, a
"canonist" had to be trained in both Roman and canon law, and
these two laws comprised the curriculum of the medieval law
schools. The jurists called the jurisprudence created by this conflation of two systems of law the ius commune, which became the
"common law" of Europe. Every student of law between 1200 and
1525 studied both Roman and canon law and became a
practitioner of law in the region where he lived (all law students
were male). His practice was informed by the principles and doctrines of the ius commune. 14
For each topic he discusses, Helmholz begins with Gratian.
This starting point permits him to illustrate the "state of the
question" and then to use Gratian as a foil for exploring later developments. A few examples demonstrate the effectiveness of
Helmholz's approach.
Election law. Helmholz devotes Chapter Two to the jurisprudential foundations of ecclesiastical governance and the canonists' contributions (pp 33-60). Election was the most important
vehicle for establishing legitimacy in the medieval church. Roman law had no defined rules for elections. Consequently, Gratian and his successors wrestled with electoral theory. Since an
officeholder's right to office depended on the legitimacy of his
election, the canonists had practical reasons for working out a set
of rules. What constituted the electoral body? Did a candidate
1 The first canonistic Gaius was Bernardus Papiensis, who wrote a Summa titulorum
decretalium circa 1191-1198. His Summa became the model for all subsequent general
treatises on canon law, such as those of Goffredus Tranensis and Hostiensis.
1" The best survey of the ius commune is Manlio Bellomo, The Common Legal Past of
Europe 1000-1800 (Catholic 1995). Scholars have often underestimated the importance of
the ius commune by considering it merely academic law, having little influence on contemporary society-reversing Watson's argument that the Roman jurists created norms
and rules for society but were untouched by it. I have discussed this tendency in Kenneth
Pennington, Learned Law, Droit Savant, Gelehrtes Recht: The Tyranny of a Concept, 20
Syracuse J Intl L & Comm 205, 205-15 (1994).
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need a majority (maiorpars) or just the support of the most important electors (saniorpars)? What should the qualifications of
officeholders be? These were not matters of abstract legal principle but real institutional problems that were of crucial signifi-

cance for ecclesiastical and secular institutions." Although Roman law did not contain much electoral theory, the canonists did
mine the work of the Roman jurists for norms that would regulate elections. When a canonical rule was violated in an election
for a good reason, the canonists justified the breaking of the
norm by the rule of law: "Cessante causa cessare debet et effectus" ("When reason fails, the effect should fail") (p 57).
This maxim is an illustration of the intricate interplay between Roman law and the ius commune, and it has found a place
in the jurisprudence and decisions of modem legal systems and
in law dictionaries. 6 Roman law contained a number of texts in
which the idea and language of this rule was adumbrated. 7 Gratian included two texts from Pope Innocent I written in 414 C.E.
in which the pope, undoubtedly borrowing from contemporary
law, stated, "Quod pro necessitate temporis statutum est, cessante necessitate debet cessare pariter quod urgebat." ("What is
established because of necessity, should cease when what dictates necessity ceases.") 8 By the early thirteenth century, the
canonists were using this rule of law to analyze many different
legal situations. Johannes Teutonicus applied it to judges who
temporarily could not exercise their office, and to curators of the
insane."' Helmholz has demonstrated the rule's importance for
' Canonical rules had much influence on modern electoral law. The topic is so impor-

tant that Jean Gaudemet, with the collaboration of Jacques Dubois, Andr6 Duval, and
Jacques Champagne, wrote a book for French law students, Les glections dans l'glise
latine des origines au XVIe sicle (Lanore 1979).
" L. De-Mauri, Regulae juris 31 (Ulrico Hoepli 11th ed 1936, reprinted 1976); Rolf
Lieberwirth, Lateinische Fachausdriickeim Recht 47 (C.F. Miller 1986); John Bouvier, 2
Bouvier's Law Dictionary and Concise Encyclopedia 2127 (Vernon 3d rev ed 1914)
(Francis Rawle, ed).
" Justinian's Code, Cod 4.37.2, 5.4.7, 6.2.8, 6.10.1, 7.26.4, 8.27.7; none of these texts
used cessante causa, but rather cessante voluntate, cessante probatione, cessante dolore,
and so on.
Gratian, Decretum, C.1 q.1 c.41; see also C.1 q.7 c.7.
1 See Johannes Teutonicus's use of this rule of law in his commentary on Compilatio
tertia3.22.1 (X 1.29.34) to the words, "admittere noluit delegatum": "Vel dic quod tempore
impotentie iurisdictionem retinet <iudex>, licet non habeat effectum, set cessante impotentia renascitur effectus. Ad instar eius qui datur curator furioso, qui cessante furore,
est curator, set non cum effectu, set redeunte furore, renascitur effectus, ut C. de curatore furiosi, Cure allis" <Cod. 5.70.6>. ("Or say that in a time of illness, a judge retains jurisdiction, but the jurisdiction has no effect. When his illness ceases, however, his jurisdiction is reborn. A similar example is a guardian given to a madman, who when the
madness ceases is still a guardian but with no effect, but when the madness returns his
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electoral doctrine, and it became, in many different areas of law,
a vehicle for understanding legal problems. 0 The jurists of the
ius commune searched for principles that unified law in much the
same way that modern physicists search for a unifying link between energy and matter that will explain the universe.
Criminal procedure. Helmholz gives another example of
canon law's search for principles and coherence in a chapter on
criminal procedure that focuses on the maxim "Non bis in idem"
("Not twice in the same"), modern civil law's counterpart to our
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. He points out
that the principle can be found in an ancient Roman statute of
the Emperor Honorius and in a passage from Ulpian (pp 287-90).
The Bible also rendered support. Saint Jerome interpreted an
opaque passage in the Prophecy of Nahum that God would not
judge a defendant twice (p 287).21 While Jerome's interpretation
is strained, it is yet another example of the importance of biblical
and theological texts in the jurisprudence of the ius commune.
Roman law offered further support for the principle. A text of the
Digest forbade that a defendant be sued twice for violating a
grave. By the end of the thirteenth century, canonists had
firmly established the principle of double jeopardy as a fundamental rule.
Just as in modern law, there were exceptions. The most
striking similarity to American law is that the canonists permitted a cleric who wished to procure an ecclesiastical office to be
examined for crimes even though he had already been tried for
them in criminal proceedings. In spite of the biblical, Roman, and
canonical prohibitions against double jeopardy, the jurists held
that "[tihe principal end of the civil proceeding was to secure the
removal of an unworthy person from ecclesiastical office

. . .

not

to punish him for his crime" (p 293).

guardianship is reborn, as in the Codex of Justinian.") (my translation).
This text has never been printed and is taken from a manuscript in the Benedictine
monastery at Admont, Austria, with the signature, Stiftsbibl.22. It can be found on fol.
208v. The text can also be found on the Web at:
http:/www.maxwell.syr.edu/maxpages/faculty/penningk.
Helmholz illustrates its use for limiting the longevity of papal privileges at p 321.
21 The biblical passage, Nahum 1:9, reads: "Quid cogitatis contra Dominum? Consummationem ipse faciet: Non consurget duplex tribulatio." It might be translated: "Do
you plot against the Lord? He will make a complete end. No tribulation will trouble him
twice." A certain amount of ingenuity is necessary to find support for double jeopardy in
this text.
Mommsen, Krueger, and Watson, eds, 4 The Digest of Justinian 47.12.6 at 787
(cited in note 4).
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Medieval jurists did not formulate the problem the same way
a modern jurist would. They did not argue that a defendant had
a right not to be tried twice for the same crime, and Helmholz
explores some of the reasons why they did not. He argues that
they viewed the "right" not to be prosecuted twice for the same
crime as not "emanating from the individual but rather from an
objective order of justice" (p 307). In this case, the spirit of canon
law recognized that the individual possessed a right, but the
right was protected by the legal order. In the twentieth century,
the legal order of nation-states has proven a frail bulwark for resisting the state's violation of the rights of citizens and noncitizens. In medieval jurisprudence, a rich brew of legal authorities external to the state-biblical, Roman, theological, and canonical-gave the legal order permanence and stability.
The jurists of the ius commune were also capable of expressing their conceptions of procedural rights in ways that seem
to anticipate modern conceptions and language. Gratian did not
recognize a defendant's right to a trial. Following earlier traditions, he acknowledged that when a person committed a notorious crime, he sometimes forfeited his right. Again the Bible
played an important role in shaping legal thought. From the
middle of the twelfth century, the canonists noticed that God had
summoned Adam and Eve to answer for their sins. If an omniscient God must summon defendants, the jurists concluded
that human judges must do so as well. Guilielmus Durantis, who
wrote a great procedural treatise, Speculum iuris, at the end of
the thirteenth century (1271-1291), declared that even the devil
must be given his day in court if accused of a crime! As is the
case in their discussion of double jeopardy, they did not formulate their arguments in terms of "a defendant's right to a trial."
They stated that a summons was embodied in natural law, and
one could argue that they believed that the right was embedded
in the natural order of things. Nevertheless, the right was absolute. Even the pope or the emperor was bound to give a defendant a trial.' In part, it was a matter of vocabulary and usage.
Within two decades, Johannes Andreae wrote about a person's right to make a will in terms that resonate with today's
language of "human rights," inherent in each human being:
"Although the form of making a will is a matter of public or civil
law, the authority and power of making a will are derived from

Kenneth Pennington, The Prince and the Law, 1200-1600: Sovereignty and Rights
in the Western Legal Tradition143-64 (California 1993).
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natural law or the law of nations... and natural rights are immutable."2 Johannes's language has a surprising modem resonance. It is, as Helmholz observes (pp 306-08), open to debate exactly what kind of rights these jurists conceived, but the spirit of
canon law fostered rights that have played a crucial role in the
development of modem rights theory.
The rights of those who are subject to the authority and
power of a state have always been defined and protected by
norms that transcend positive law (the law of the human legislator). Following a pattern that would repeat itself in every other
European legal system, the jurists of the canon law gradually restricted its scope and sources, eventually limiting it to the judicial decisions and legislation of the papal curia. A subtext of each
of Helmholz's chapters is the growing importance of papal law
and the consequent narrowing of sources of law from the broad
fields that Gratian cultivated. As the papacy became the bureaucratic and legal center of the church, papal law weeded out its rivals in the same way that the legal systems of the modem nation-states have isolated themselves into balkanized and selfreferencing systems. This process of creating legal systems that
recognize only their own positive law was just beginning in the
period that Helmholz examines. During the course of the next
three centuries, papal law did make great strides in obliterating
other sources of law, but the jurists still had many tools with
which to limit papal legislative and judicial authority, particularly the norms of the ius commune.
The law of privileges. In another chapter, Helmholz discusses the system through which the papacy granted rights in
the church, the law of privileges (pp 311-38). Papal privileges
may seem a long way from modern law but, as Helmholz points
out, present-day governments give special rights to individuals,
groups, and institutions that exempt them from the normal provisions of the law. In the Middle Ages, these privileges were most
often granted to institutions or groups like religious orders.
Privileges presented Gratian with a problem. He included sixteen
early papal letters in the Decretum stating that the pope could
not grant exceptions to the ancient canons of the church. To
counter the force of these letters, Gratian used six Biblical examples to demonstrate that exceptions to the law were not unlawful.
Johannes Andreae, Novella in Sextum 302A (modem pagination) at VI 5.11.7 § Et
sciendum (Academische Druck 1963): "Licet forma testandi sit de lure publico vel civili
voluntas et potestas testandi sunt de lure nature vel gentium.., set Jura naturalia sunt
mmutabilia."
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Even Jesus, for example, had cleansed a leper against "the letter
of the law," and by doing so proved that "he who bestows his
authority on the law is not subject to it" (pp 314-15).25 After a
string of biblical justifications, Gratian turned to a text of Roman
law taken from the Theodosian Code (438 C.E.) that introduced
an idea that would remain a cornerstone of the jurisprudence of
privileges: "We command that rescripts contrary to law be rejected ... unless they do not harm another."" From the Bible
Gratian took authority and power to change law; from Roman
law he adopted the concept that a privilege should not injure the
rights of another. There is a certain delicious irony in the fact
that he cited a secular text to establish an ethical norm and
turned to a religious text to confirm a jurisprudential principle.
As Helmholz demonstrates, the canonical jurisprudence of privileges is a gloss on these two principles: "The principal goals [of
later canonists] ... boiled down to two. The first was establishing
the authority and the inviolability of papal privileges. The second
was restricting an injury to the rights of others" (p 323).
With each of Helmholz's richly researched chapters, a new
aspect of the "spirit of canon law" emerges. The process tends to
unfold as follows: The canonists confront a problem of jurisdiction, rights, or institutional structure. They build a jurisprudence
to describe contemporary practice, using Roman law, custom,
theological thought, biblical and canonical examples, and the
canons of early church councils to refine their thought. Out of
this wide and deep lode of sources, they created doctrines, definitions, rules, and procedures that are still embedded in contemporary law.
The enormous range of subjects treated by canon law will
surprise the modern jurist accustomed to thinking of ecclesiastical law as an obscure sideshow of legal history. Helmholz discusses the rights of the poor, the jurisprudence of the oath, property rights, canonistic contributions to criminal procedure, and
the rights of ecclesiastical magistrates to exercise secular jurisdiction. Other chapters are devoted to topics that one might expect in a book on canonical jurisprudence: baptism, marriage,

Gratian, Decretum, C.25 q.1 d.p.c.16 (cited in note 18): "Ita ergo canonibus auctoritatem prestat, ut se ipsam non subiciat eis." The Biblical passage is Matthew 8:1-4.
" Later incorporated into Justinian's Code, Cod. 1.19(22).7: "Rescripta contra ius
elicita ab omnibus iudicibus praecipimus refutari, nisi forte aliquid est, quod non laedat
aliure." This text became the most important text for the jurists of the ius commune in
discussing the issue of when a ruler could or should derogate the provisions of natural
law. See Pennington, The Princeand the Law at 130-32 (cited in note 23).
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blasphemy, and excommunication. Helmholz has written one of
those rare books that both students and scholars will find useful
and thought-provoking.
For those readers who have stayed with me to this point I
would like to raise one last issue. Of what use are these books
and, indeed, legal history, to the modern lawyer? Is the "spirit" of
these laws of any practical interest or importance? If one bases
the answer on the number of law students who take courses in
European legal history or the number of law schools that require
a course in legal history of their graduates, the answer is little or
none. If, however, one grapples with the issues that both these
books raise in different ways-the role of a jurist in society and
the range of sources that jurists might recognize as being relevant to their work-the answer might be more positive.
Watson argues in his book that jurists can create a sophisticated legal system without looking beyond their own law. Law,
he seems to argue, can be created by generations of subtle minds
working out legal problems by using logic and elegant arguments
that convince the profession. I do not believe that Roman jurists
resembled Watson's, although I would concede that brilliant law
can sometimes evolve in splendid isolation, cut off from outside
influences and even separated from the needs and norms of society. But only occasionally. Most often law evolves under the sway
of a myriad of influences. This truth is the best argument for
studying legal history.
The most important conclusion to draw from the study of the
Roman jurists is that they were essential sources of law and vehicles of legal change in Roman society. I use these jurists in my
legal history classes to demonstrate how fruitful the interplay between the "intellectuals" of the legal system and legal institutions was in ancient Rome, and, by analogy, how jurists and the
courts could create a fruitful dialectic in today's legal systems.
Watson has acknowledged this function of the Roman jurists in
earlier books,27 but in this book he has downplayed this aspect of
their importance by highlighting their isolation from society. His
thesis diminishes their importance for Roman law and makes it
harder to understand how Roman law became the bedrock upon
which modern jurisprudence rests.
Watson would readily grant, I think, that the jurists were a
source of law in the ancient world. Some of the jurists, but not

See, for example, Alan Watson, Sources of Law, Legal Change, and Ambiguity 1-24
(Pennsylvania 1984).
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all, had the ius respondendi ex auctoritateprincipis (right of responding on the authority of the prince) during the classical period. This right granted by the emperor gave their opinions legal
force. Early in the second century, the Emperor Hadrian ruled
that when privileged jurists agreed on a particular point, judges
were bound to follow their opinion. Hadrian's elevation of juristic
opinion led, by the time of the Emperors Theodosius and Valentinianus, to the Law of Citations in which the jurists' general
writings, not just individual opinions on a certain issue, obtained
the force of law by imperial decree. We have no way of knowing
how this transition took place or when it began to influence the
practice of Roman courts. But we do know that the jurists retained their status for centuries, altering their opinions on the
basis of justice (equitas) and utility (utilitas), not just elegant argument. I think it is inconceivable that Watson's jurists could
have retained their privileged position without there having been
much more interplay between them and society. Whether my
doubts have any merit or not, his pheasant hunters provide much
food for thought about what the proper role of a jurist should be
in a legal system. Should judges recognize the scribblings of law
professors (not just American, but also French, German, Italian,
and Japanese) as authoritative in deciding cases? Should jurisprudence be a closed intellectual system that operates without an
eye to society, social problems, or the outside world?
If Watson raises the issue of the proper role of a jurist,
Helmholz encourages us to think about how broad the spectrum
of sources should be in a legal system. Here too legal history offers thought-provoking perspectives. Helmholz's jurists drew
upon a wide range of sources that they comfortably labeled "law."
Between about 1320 and 1600, a new genre of jurisprudence
arose called consilia. These were legal briefs that litigants would
request from famous jurists and submit for the consideration of
the court. A confluence of juristic opinions (and the money to pay
for them) could affect the decisions of judges. Until the seventeenth century, jurists of the ius commune drew upon sources of
law that transcended the law of the locality in which they
worked. Dutch jurists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries cited decisions and legal literature from Portugal, Italy,
France, Germany, Scotland, and Spain in their consilia. This
"pan-geographical jurisprudence" died slowly. Statutes forbidding the use of court decisions from other legal systems began
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appearing only in the eighteenth century.28 American Supreme
Court justices still cited Roman and canon law commonly in the
late nineteenth century.2 9 In the twentieth century, legislatures,
courts, and legal education have focused on the supreme sovereignty of national positive law to the exclusion of most other
norms. Quite understandably, this narrowing of the sources of
law diminished the importance of comparative and historical law
in legal education. The culmination of these developments came
in the nineteenth century with the triumph of John Austin's legal
positivism, which has provided the theoretical foundations for
the sovereignty of the modern nation-state. The result of this
"strict construction" of legal sources has made it difficult for jurists to break out of the presuppositions of each legal tradition. I
have argued that human rights have been especially limited by
the narrow horizons of "balkanized" legal systems."0
The distinguished Italian legal historian, Paolo Grossi, recently published a book in which he lamented the reduction of
law to those norms that the state itself creates. Grossi argues
that when the state is the only producer of law, it loses its natural connection to the needs and just rights of the people. He dates
the first stages of this development in European law to the late
Middle Ages.3 ' Before then, legal norms could also be found outside the legislative, judicial, and executive organs of political
authority. Helmholz illustrates with much learning and skill the
kind of legal system that Grossi idealizes.
If jurists today could cite the arguments and norms of ancient Roman law, of the ius commune, and of other legal systems,
they could not only expand the definition of what law is but also
radically alter legal education. I am convinced, for example, that
the American system of justice would not be able to take the due
process rights of illegal aliens and other rights of non-citizens
away quite so easily if American lawyers could argue that the
right to due process is not only based on American constitutional
and positive law but on the subjective right of human beings to
' See G. R. Dolezalek, "StareDecisis": PersuasiveForce of Precedentand Old Authority (12th-20th Century), Inaugural Lecture, University of Cape Town, New Series No 156,
2-3, 11-13 (Cape Town 1989).
See, for example, the remarkable array of sources used to establish the validity of
the principle that a person is innocent until proven guilty in Coffin v United States, 156
US 432, 455 (1894) (citing both Gratian's Decretum and canon law).
' Pennington, The Princeand the Law at 286-90 (cited in note 23).
" Paolo Grossi, L'ordinegiuridico medievale 21, 52-61, 233-34 (Editori Laterza 1995).
Mario Ascheri, Eine mittelalterlicheRechtsordnung-fir heute?, 15 Rechtshistorisches J
51, 51-65 (1996), has pointed out very well the implications of Grossi's arguments.
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have their cases heard in court. Moreover, they could argue that
this idea is not a recent creation but has roots deep in the sources
of Western law." The concept of transcendent rights, norms, and
principles is not alien to American law and society. Thomas Jefferson would have been perplexed by the idea that only "citizens"
were entitled to his "inalienable rights."
This expansion of law's sources is not utopian. The jurists of
the European Union must delicately draw upon comparative law
and look far beyond individual legal systems if they are to recreate successfully a new European ius commune as agreed upon in
the Treaty of Maastricht. International lawyers have struggled
for some time with the problem of finding sources of law that
would counterbalance and pierce the protective shield of the law
erected by the sovereign nation-state. Theodor Meron has advocated that jurists should look to international norms and customs, a source of law that cannot be suffocated by the positive
law of the nation-state, as a new source of international law.3 3
Gaius, Gratian, and the jurists of the ius commune would not
view his suggestion as a radical departure but as an accepted
practice. In a world where the sources of law became catholic, legal education would have to change. Comparative law and legal
history would have to have a much larger place in the curriculum
than these subjects have today.
If legal history deserves such a place in the curriculum of today's law schools, it must earn it by producing books that not
only restore memories of forgotten jurists, doctrines, and practices, but that also provide different ways of thinking about law.
It must produce more than "textbooks"; it must produce books
like Helmholz's that instruct with the lessons of the past and inspire ideas about the future. Law is, I think, quite different from
the physical sciences in its relationship to the past. The
"experimentalism" of Roger Bacon (circa 1213-1291) is only of antiquarian interest to a modern researcher of optics and light, but
the jurisprudence of the past can be of real relevance to the present. If judged by the criteria of stimulating thought about the
proper role of jurists and of encouraging perspectives that would
transcend the paradigms, boundaries, and definitions of modern
law, Hehnholz's book is a brilliant success. Watson's book is more
problematic as a heuristic tool for the classroom. His central the' I discuss the roots of our conception of due process in Pennington, The Prince and
the Law at ch 4-7 (cited in note 23).
Theodor Meron, Human Rights and HumanitarianNorms as Customary Law 24648 (Clarendon 1989).
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sis does encourage us to think about the relationship of jurists to
the law. If one were to construct an ideal world, would its jurists
be concerned only with the inexorable logic of the law, isolated
from practice and the society in which they live? Since I know of
no legal system, past or present, in which jurists resemble Watson's pheasant hunters, I have my doubts about whether the
question has much relevance for thinking about the sociology of
law. Law and the civil polity cannot and should not be separated.
The essence of legal thought is the elegant and intricate dialectic
between the world of the mind and the world of men and women.
Taking one or the other away would leave jurisprudence impov
erished.

The Right to Community?
JacquelineBhabhat
The Community of Rights. Alan Gewirth. University of Chicago
Press, 1996. Pp xvi, 380.
Does the modern state have a duty to implement basic economic and social rights for its population? If so, what program of
action should the state adopt to realize this obligation?
At the dawn of a new American presidential term, as affirmative action programs come under severe threat and welfare
entitlements are abolished, the answer to the first is increasingly
negative (and the second therefore irrelevant). Conversely, in the
realm of public international law, the human rights regime established after World War II answered the first question with a
qualified affirmative. States have an obligation to promote the
economic and social rights of their citizens insofar as they have
the available resources to do so. Unlike the absolute and immediately binding standard imposed with respect to such rights as
freedom of thought, and protection from torture or arbitrary deprivation of life,' the requirements on states to provide food,
housing, medical care, and basic education were formulated in
terms of contingency and progressive realization.2 As to the second question, it was left up to states to decide what steps their
resources permitted them to take to realize economic and social
rights. The international monitoring and enforcement machinery
established to ensure states' compliance with their obligations
with respect to civil and political rights3 was not paralleled in the
economic and social fields.
t Associate Director of the Center for International Studies and Lecturer at the Law
School, The University of Chicago. I would like to thank Robert Kirschner for reading an
earlier draft and Martha Nussbaum for helpful comments.
' The so-called non-derogable civil and political rights are set out in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Arts 4-8, 11, 15, 16, 18, UNGA Res 2200(XXI), 999
UNTS 171, 174-78 (Dec 19, 1966, entered into force Mar 23, 1976) ("ICCPR").
2 "Each State Party to the Covenant [on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights] undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation... to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means." International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art
2(1), UNGA Res 2200(XXI), 993 UNTS 3, 5, (Dec 19, 1966, entered into force Jan 3, 1976).
The most significant is the right of individuals, under the Optional Protocol to the
1117
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At first glance, this dichotomous approach appears perverse.
Civil and political rights are considered "first generation" rights,
while economic and social rights constitute a "second generation,"
even though the former presuppose a certain attainment of the
latter-if indeed the two types of rights can be disentangled in
the first place. Access to food, shelter, and basic education is a
necessary precondition for the exercise of freedom of thought; indeed, the failure to provide a minimal, life-sustaining standard of
living in the modern world of plenty arguably represents an arbitrary deprivation of life.4 The constitutions of the Soviet Union
and most of the old-regime East European states reflected this
thinking by enumerating a wide range of social and economic
rights.
In the West, however, a distinction between the two sets of
rights has been justified by pointing to differences in the feasibility of their implementation. States can establish structures
that protect their citizens' civil and political liberties, but they
cannot create natural or social resources by fiat. Rights to social
and economic goods, while worthy aspirations, are unenforceable.
Enshrining such rights, the argument goes, is therefore pointless
at best, and moreover runs the risk of dangerously discrediting
the worth of other constitutional obligations.5 While this may
well be true for impoverished states, it hardly reflects the situation of many affluent states where unequal distribution, not
scarcity, is the principal source of deprivation.
In The Community of Rights, Alan Gewirth boldly takes on
these questions. First, he proposes and substantiates a powerful
philosophical argument in favor of the state's duty to provide basic economic and social rights for its citizens. Second, and perhaps surprisingly for a philosopher, he cogently elaborates a detailed account of the socioeconomic and political strategies necessary to turn his theory into practice. The book starts with a
philosophical account of the relationship between human action
and rights. It details the nature of positive rights and argues for
the centrality of a principle of mutuality, which links individuals
to the establishment of a just community based on human rights.
The second half of the book then describes, in illuminating and
ICCPR, to present claims of human rights violations to the Human Rights Committee.
For a discussion of the implicit overlap between the two international human rights
covenants, see Craig Scott, The Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights
Norms: Towards a PartialFusion of the InternationalCovenants on Human Rights, 27
Osgoode Hall L J 769, 771-72 (1989).
Cass R. Sunstein makes this argument in Something Old, Something New, 1 East
Eur Const Rev 18, 18-20 (Spring 1992), and Against Positive Rights, 2 East Eur Const
Rev 35,35-38 (Winter 1993).
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convincing detail, how the philosophical argument translates into
concrete policies regarding welfare, education, property rights,
employment, and industrial and political democracy.
Building on his earlier book Reason and Morality6 and
drawing together a substantial corpus of writing by others, Gewirth traces the guiding socioeconomic principles-what he calls
"the economic biography"---that would govern a society concerned
with the protection of individual human rights (pp 99-100). He
argues, in opposition to an adversarial conception of the relationship between community and individual rights, that the two have
a relation of mutual support. Thus, it is a duty of the wider community (which he identifies with the state rather than the market, charitable organizations, or other institutions of civil society)
to promote individuals' ability to achieve a life of freedom and
well-being. At the same time, it is an obligation of individuals,
once they have the capacity to do so, to exert effort to realize such
a life and to aid others in the same pursuit.
The Community of Rights focuses its argument particularly
on those worst off and best off. According to Gewirth, the most
vulnerable members of society-victims of the devastating material and psychic effects of prolonged poverty and deprivation, who
are unable by their own efforts to achieve a minimal dignified
standard of living-are entitled to particular kinds of assistance,
such as welfare support, intensive pre-schooling on the model of
Head Start, and public works jobs with child care provided. The
most affluent-beneficiaries of positive socialization and heredity, and consumers of a disproportionate share of societal resources-have an obligation to support such programs, if only
through progressive taxation schemes. For their tax dollars, affluent citizens receive dividends in the form of reduced social divisiveness. By eclectically combining a focus on the state's obligations with an emphasis on individual effort and responsibility,
Gewirth distinguishes his robust social democratic position from
the approach of communitarians, socialists, and liberal theorists.
What sets The Community of Rights apart from other works
defending social and economic rights is its dialectical underpinning. The starting point of the book is that all human action is
necessarily connected with the concept of rights (p 18). Gewirth
advances a deductive argument (elaborated in earlier work) to
establish this. He begins from two assumptions: first, that human beings can act freely, and second, that they act purposively
to attain "well-being." Gewirth then moves from the human
' Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago 1978).
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rights of the individual to the necessity of rights for all human
beings.
This argument concludes where modern international human rights law commences, with the proposition that all human
beings (as rational and volitional agents) have inherent dignity
and equal and inalienable rights. Despite its formal deductive
nature, Gewirth's reasoning is of considerable interest for human
rights lawyers precisely because it does not simply assert the
"inherent dignity" of human beings as an a priori assumption, as
does the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or as a culturally specific construct.8 It is because human beings have the capacity to act purposively that they have the "inherent dignity"
that distinguishes them from animals, plants or other forms of
life, and require, as a matter of rational necessity, the fulfillment
of basic economic and social rights.9 In the absence of the basic
necessities of life, human beings lose some or all of their purposive ability to act and are therefore deprived of the possibility
of realizing their inherent dignity.
This argument presents a difficulty with Gewirth's thesis. If
being an agent requires having freedom and well-being, then either there is no point in claiming a right to these goods because
all human agents already have them, or, given the massive extent of human deprivation and oppression for many millions
around the world, they cannot be necessary conditions of action.
In response, Gewirth invokes a notion of potentially different
levels of human agency: agents may have freedom and well-being
insofar as they are capable of purposive and rational activity, but
their circumstances may change so that they lose these conditions of action. In other words, it is not inevitable that they will
have these goods prospectively and indefinitely. Hence the necessity of human rights as a social safety net.
Alternatively, the deprivation of the world's poorest people
may be taken to indicate not an inability to act or to achieve any
purposive goals, but a mismatch between capacities and social
conditions; they may well have the capacities but lack an adequate set of social conditions. Typically such populations have
only a limited capacity for purposive activity because they only

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble, UNGA Res 217 A(flI), Doc
A1810 (1948).
8 See, for this approach, Rhoda E. Howard, Dignity, Community, and Human Rights,
in Abdullah Ahmed An-Na'im, ed, Human Rights in Cross-CulturalPerspectives:A Quest
for Consensus 81, 83 (Pennsylvania 1992).
' According to Gewirth, the mentally and physically disabled have rights "to the degree to which they approach being normal agents" (p 24). More on this below.
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have access to a basic, minimal level of well-being. But well-being
comprises more than the bare minimum of subsistence; it includes the ability to have control over one's own life, and to
achieve basic self-respect by virtue of education and the ability to
earn. Without these, human endeavor is inevitably doomed to
bare animal existence. So there are levels of well-being ° and correlative levels of purposive action (p 14).
It is the failure of states to ensure access to this more comprehensive well-being for the deprived masses that underlies the
apathy, destructiveness, and low level of productive activity
characteristic of many poor countries. Though The Community of
Rights does not focus on questions of international distribution of
resources, by linking human action to access to basic rights Gewirth's theory avoids the myopic culturalism of some recent accounts of global inequalities. Far from cultural anarchy or civilizational clash being at the root of human misery in the nonwestern world, as suggested by writers such as Robert Kaplan"
and Samuel Huntington, 2 it is the failure of governments to institute effective socioeconomic reforms and redistributive programs that raises the most critical questions facing the international community today.
Gewirth's position also contrasts in two key areas with that
of John Rawls, despite their common focus on the situation and
needs of the most deprived members of society. As we have seen,
Gewirth constructs his argument for a community of rights on
the basis of the rational necessity of rights, proceeding by way of
logical deduction. By contrast, the Rawlsian theory of justice
stipulates, as is well known, that any actor must make his moral
choices from an "original position," behind a "veil of ignorance."
Gewirth notes critically that there is an element of contingency
here, because no argument establishes why, as a matter of neces-

" The book details a hierarchy of three different levels of well-being: "basic wellbeing" (the essential preconditions of action, such as life and health), "nonsubtractive
well-being" (the abilities and conditions for maintaining one's effectiveness, such as not
being lied to or stolen from), and "additive well-being" (the conditions for increasing one's
capabilities, such as education and self-esteem) (p 14). Though Gewirth does not address
this point directly, presumably civil and political rights, which enable individuals with
the basic material preconditions to act effectively in the world, would fall within the
third, additive level ofwell-being. For an alternative account of different levels of freedom
and well-being required to act, see, for example, Amartya Sen, Capabilityand Well-Being,
in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, eds, The Quality of Life 30, 33-38 (Clarendon
1993).
I Robert D. Kaplan, The ComingAnarchy, Atlantic Monthly 44, 46-68 (Feb 1994).
Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 Foreign Affairs 22, 29-48
(Summer 1993).
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sity, a human agent must accept Rawls's two principles of justice
(p 27).
But surely it is precisely this element of choice that is crucial
in the implementation of human rights. Herein lies a possible
weakness of The Community of Rights. Freedom and well-being
turn from normative abstractions to practical actuality only
when individual citizens, politicians, and governments decide it
is in their interest to move forward and implement them. In most
cases, given the imbalances of power and other resources, redistribution is not mandated by mutuality or any other abstract
principle. Revolutionary disruption and massive social upheaval
do not threaten ruling elites within most countries. Nor does the
position of the wealthy nations in the present geopolitical climate
require them to attend to the well-being of the most needy nations and their citizens. Indeed, Gewirth distances himself from
what he considers an excessively adversarial account of the
power of the disenfranchised to effectively threaten the powerful
(p 122). Instead, he sets out his position in more sanguine terms:
The state, as the community of rights, imposes taxes in order to secure the economic rights of those who are more deprived and thereby to narrow the inequalities that subject
them to unwarranted superiorities of power. In this way
rights and community reinforce one another, because these
economic rights are fulfilled through the mutualist provisions of the community (p 179).
But he provides no account of how this extensive economic redistribution-involving progressive taxation and means-tested benefits, for example-is to be accepted as desirable (let alone necessary) by those burdened. Without being unduly pessimistic about
human altruism, it is clear from the present distribution of resources, both within and between states, that the necessity for
mutuality and redistribution has been singularly neglected in the
interests of self-advancement.
A second difference between Gewirth and Rawls points in
the opposite direction. It goes to the question of human achievement and effort. Rawls emphasizes the need for equal opportunity to access society's basic institutions, but he does recognize
that effort (stimulated by economic incentives) and individual
merit have a proper role to play in determining access to resources, jobs, and other social goods in that society." Gewirth, for
" Gewirth's critique of what he considers to be Rawls's neglect of the responsibility of
individuals to use their own abilities (p 190) confuses Rawls's account of the basic institutional structure that determines people's prospects in a just society (where he does indeed
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his part, stresses the element of individual effort and responsibility as an essential basis for the principle of mutuality underlying the community of rights. Once individuals are in a position
to be productive agents-either unaided if they are sufficiently
well-endowed or as a result of the community's implementation
of social and economic rights-they have an obligation to contribute to the community. Only an absence of productive potential, not a lack of personal effort, can justify welfare dependence.
But while Gewirth characterizes Rawls's position as being
determinist (p 190), he does not adequately explain the genesis of
the individual "effort" on which he relies. Consider Gewirth's
treatment of two key areas where individual motivation relates
to socioeconomic provision: entitlement to welfare and participation in worker cooperatives. In the first, Gewirth correctly highlights the fact that "[m] any welfare recipients come from a background in which the debilitating effects of poverty have already
left a heavy mark" (p 128). They therefore frequently lack the
psychological attributes necessary to seek work or even participate effectively in "workfare" and other social programs. The
book sets out a persuasive account of the conceptual and practical limitations of these programs, a critique that could, mutatis
mutandis, apply to a wide array of state welfare strategies (pp
128-31). Gewirth's solution is a form of social engineering designed precisely to change these individuals' motivational structure:
It is hence naive to expect that these persons directly have
the emotional and intellectual abilities, including relevant
skills and an effective sense of personal responsibility,
needed to take adequate advantage of the opportunities they
may be offered. In this regard, it is vitally important to seek
out their children at a very early age and to put them into
educationalprograms in which these debilitatingeffects can
be strongly countered (pp 128-29, emphasis added).
Given this acknowledged association between institutional
factors and individual motivation, it is not clear what place there
is in Gewirth's account for individual effort as an independent
variable.
Similar questions arise from the analysis of individual participation in forms of workplace democracy. In the optimal
worker cooperative employment situation, for example, where

downplay individual effort) with the allowances Rawls makes for inequalities derived
from differential effort or talent. I am grateful to Martha Nussbaum for this point.
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industries are run and owned by the workers and exhibit a
"flourishing kind of socialized entrepreneurship" (p 300), the
solidarity essential to the system has to be developed and built in
by institutional means so that each individual actor becomes, if
he or she is not already, "a reasonable self' (p 304). The inherent
rationality of the principle of human rights is thus a socially produced realization, which has to be consistently and constantly
taught. Again, this seems to suggest that the motivational structure required to act in a mutualist manner is irreducibly a product of external factors rather than of any inherent individual
ability to exert "effort."
But if the givenness of the individual bearer of rights is
problematic in Gewirth's theory, so too, arguably, is the entity
standing at the opposite end of his analytic stage, the community. The problems can be posed in terms of two questions. First,
who is the community of rights to be composed of? Second, given
that our current world includes multiple communities, what is
the relationship of each community to the others?
According to Gewirth, all human agents are bearers of
rights; however, he qualifies this general point in two ways. The
first qualification is a contrast between "normal" agents and
other humans who lack the ability or right to be purposive prospective agents. Mentally and physically disabled humans fit
within this category (p 65) and at various points in the book, so
do "criminals" (p 315). Gewirth argues that the less ability humans have for productive agency, the "less they are able to fulfill
their purposes without endangering themselves and others, and
this is why their generic rights must be [ ] reduced" (p 65).
This association of rights to agentive capabilities is questionable, as is the unqualified connection between disability and
danger. True, the freedom (though not the material well-being) of
severely mentally subnormal individuals may properly be curtailed for their own safety. Yet it is not clear that this utilitarian
argument is sustainable for the overwhelming majority of affected individuals. Difference is not the same as danger, though
some may perceive it that way. As Martha Minow has emphasized, this sort of vocabulary, "that distinguish[es] the self from
others, the normal group from the abnormal, and autonomous
individuals from those in relationships of dependency... ends up
contributing to rather than challenging assigned categories of difference that manifest social prejudice and misunderstanding." 4
" Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American
Law 9 (Cornell 1990).
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Moreover, Gewirth is silent on the question of how to resolve conflicts between the interests of the "normal" majority and of the
"subnormal" minority. For example, he does not address the
questions of integrating mentally and physically disabled children into normal classrooms, resolving disputes over the siting of
residential facilities for the disabled, and the like. In the case of
"criminals" (presented here as a strangely essentialized category), the conflicts with the interests of the majoritarian sections
of the community are even clearer, yet Gewirth leaves the area
completely unexplored.
Gewirth's second qualification concerns the broader question
of who should be part of the "us" of community. Given that the
state has a duty to meet individuals' needs for freedom and wellbeing, what criteria should determine the community of beneficiaries? Who is and who is not included within the polity? During
an era of massive migratory flows, refugee displacements, and
supra-national unions such as the European Union, NAFTA, and
Mercosul, this is an increasingly urgent question. 5 Yet Gewirth
fails to discuss the rights of non-citizens to inclusion in polities,
particularly affluent polities (p 289). He does allude to the critical issues at stake, for example, in restricting universal social
and political rights to "members [does he mean citizens, legal
residents, physically present individuals?] of societies geographically demarcated as countries or nation-states" (p 86), but he
does not clarify whether this is a purely pragmatic or a normative restriction." Though he asks, "i1ow can the resident of Chicago help to fulfill the pressing agency needs that the residents of
Bosnia or Afghanistan or Somalia or Ecuador cannot fulfill for
themselves by their own efforts?" (p 55), he seems to accept as
inevitable restrictive or exclusionary state immigration and citizenship laws (p 294). This omission is significant. The stakes in
having access to freedom and well-being-and the problem of
mutuality-are raised sharply when destitute non-citizens, parSee, for example, Will Kymlicka's recent discussion of multicultural citizenship,
and particularly his useful distinction between three forms of group-differentiated rights,
in his Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights 26-33 (Clarendon
1995).
" The full passage runs as follows:
The universality here envisaged may be restricted, for reasons of practical convenience of effectuation, to members of societies geographically demarcated as countries or nation-states; but in principle it applies internationally as well. At the same
time, this universality does not militate against the particularism whereby persons
give special consideration to the members of their own families and other partial
groups of friends or colleagues. Such particularism not only is consistent with but is
justified by the universal principle of human rights (p 86).
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ticularly those fleeing persecution, are denied access to more affluent countries.
In a larger sense, the question of ethnic or cultural coherence
or diversity of the polity goes to the heart of one's understanding
of what "community" is. One of Gewirth's models of economic
democracy is the worker cooperative experiment at Mondragon in
the Basque region of Northern Spain. It is clear that the ethnic
coherence and cultural solidarity of the Basque work force, and
the correlative absence of the "vast labor mobility and heterogeneity" that characterizes "existing capitalist industrial societies,"
(p 308) were critical components of the project's success (p 302).
Indeed, Gewirth goes on to argue that a reduction in labor mobility is critical to the viability of such projects. But he does not
explore the exclusionary consequences of this model for immigrants, migrant workers, and others. 7
This problem raises the broader question of the relationship
between nation-states. While The Community of Rights focuses
unapologetically 8 on the United States, Gewirth refers to the
need for international cooperation and a universalist approach to
the enforcement of the community of rights. He rightly acknowledges the primacy of the individual state as a vehicle for the
translation of moral rights into human entitlements. Other theorists may argue that the nation-state is in terminal decline, 9 but
in the absence of effective international enforcement mechanisms, the state remains the appropriate custodian of the duties
generated by a theory of human rights. Gewirth, however, neglects the complex nature of interstate relations and the critical
effect of these relations on access to human rights.

"7He cites Switzerland as an example of an existing industrial society where
"community attachments [have] markedly ... decrease[d] labor mobility" (p 308). But
Switzerland has one of the largest foreign labor forces, and its denial of citizenship rights
to long-established migrant workers-particularly Italians-is notorious.
18 Gewirth defends his focus on the United States as follows:
Although the problems, histories and traditions of each country are to some extent
unique, the American experience can be taken to be broadly representative of many
other Western countries . . .insofar as other countries have been developing economically according to Western patterns, the American problems can be taken at
least in part to apply to them as well, either in the present or in the not too indefinite future (p 111).
" "[We are in the process of moving to a global order in which the nation-state has
become obsolete and other formations for allegiance and identity have taken its place."
Arjun Appadurai, Patriotismand Its Futures, 5 Pub Culture 411, 421 (1993). See also
Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash, Globalization, Modernity and the Spatialization of
Social Theory: An Introduction,in Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash and Roland Robertson,
eds, Global Modernities 1, 1-2 (Sage 1995); Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: CulturalDimensionsof Globalization22 (Minnesota 1996).
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Interstate relations affect rights in two ways. First, affluent
states' policies are frequently a reflection of, or work in tandem
with, massive transnational corporate interests. These interests
operate to the detriment of the majority of residents of underdeveloped countries, through structural adjustment policies" and
other forms of economic and political domination. Therefore,
much interstate cooperation is principally characterized by a
negative effect on the productive abilities of those worst off. This
reality makes Gewirth's account of possible interstate intervention seem dangerously wishful:
Where governments do not have the will or the resources to
fulfill the rights, they must be helped by other governments,
especially through facilitating processes of democratization
and developing in their own members the abilities of productive agency whereby they can provide the needed resources
for themselves, and also by making international trade less
subject to domination by richer nations (pp 353-54, emphasis
added).
Such a consensual process is hard to conceive, and still harder to
achieve.
Second, the post-war period has witnessed an increasing
polarization between affluent and non-affluent states concerning
access to human rights protection. This disjunction has become
more marked since the end of the Cold War removed some of the
equalizing checks and balances in the world system. At the same
time that collaboration between states within regional blocs or
economic networks is picking up steam, the processes of exclusion that have long operated between individual states are now
being transferred to larger interstate groupings. Mutuality of a
sort is at work, but only within circumscribed geographically or
economically defined interest groups. Affluent states have made
concerted moves to fortify their common borders against asylum
seekers and to regionalize the responsibility for exilic relocation
within refugees' region of origin.2' Gewirth does not provide an

" These policies are routinely demanded of third world governments by international
organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, in return for
loans and debt forgiveness. The pursuit of free market policies, the reduction of state subsidies, and the economic liberalization associated with structural adjustment all impact
most onerously on societies' most deprived members.
1 For a justification of this position by a prominent refugee advocate and scholar, see
James C. Hathaway, Can InternationalRefugee Law Be Made Relevant Again?, in U.S.
Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 1996 14, 14-19 (Immigration and Refugee
Services of America 1996).
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account of how the principle of mutuality would work in the context of this sort of regionally configured community of rights.
These omissions do not detract from the importance of this
erudite and lucid work. In elaborating his vision of the community of rights, Gewirth succeeds in drawing together a huge literature on the social and economic policies that could improve
the functioning of social democracies. He establishes persuasively, with great scholarly mastery of the field, just how crucial
these "second generation" rights are for modern democratic society. This book draws together much of the material on which the
critical debates of our times over social and economic policy must
depend. Most usefully, The Community of Rights articulates a
tension between normative and pragmatic considerations, raising
fundamental questions about human rights enforceability, questions that are as difficult to resolve as they are urgent.

